Governance structure and external audit price: evidence from an emerging economy by Muhamad Sori, Zulkarnain & Mohamad, Shamsher
Governance Structure and External Audit Price: Evidence from an Emerging Economy
259
Int. J urnal of Economics and Management 2(2): 259 – 279 (2008) ISSN 1823 - 836X
Governance Structure and External Audit Price:
Evidence from an Emerging Economy
*aZULKARNAIN MUHAMAD SORI AND bSHAMSHER MOHAMAD
a&bFaculty of Economics and Management,Universiti Putra Malaysia, Serdang,
Selangor, Malaysia
ABSTRACT
This study provides new evidence on the relationship between external
audit price and corporate governance of the largest (based on market
capitalization) 100 listed firms on both the main and second board of the
Bursa Malaysia (BMB) (previously known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange). The findings show that for main board companies, external
audit price is positively and significantly associated with corporate
size, complexity and internal governance variable (i.e. director’s
remuneration). For the second board firms, complexity, corporate size
and internal governance variables (i.e. proportion of non-executive
directors to total directors) were important determinants of external
audit pricing. External audit price had a significant negative relationship
with individual shareholders ownership for both main and second board
companies, and companies’ age for companies listed on the second
board.
Keywords: External  Audit Fee, Corporate Governance, Bursa Malaysia,
Retail Shareholdings, Corporate Age, Firm Size.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, a sizeable number of studies have examined the relationship
between audit pricing model and corporate governance characteristics in developed
* Corresponding author: E-Mail: zms@putra.upm.edu.my.
Any remaining errors or omissions rest solely with the author(s) of this paper.
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economies (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 1994; Short et al, 1999; Peel and Clatworthy,
2001; Clatworthy and Peel, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006). The Cadbury Report (1992)
viewed the auditor’s report as “one of the corner stones of corporate governance”.
Peel and Clatworthy (2001) highlights that audit report contributes significantly
towards “effective governance of modern corporations”. In Malaysia, a series of
reforms has been initiated, for example, shifting from merit based to disclosure
based regulatory system since 1996, followed by a number of corporate governance
reform activities after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to further enhance the level of
good governance practices in the market. Among the various governance issues
addressed by these reforms, the role of external auditor if facilitating good
governance has been highlighted. The high level of Finance Committee on Corporate
Governance regards auditor as the external force responsible for good corporate
governance. Specifically, the reforms had implications on the link between audit
fees and the role of external auditors in ensuring good governance among
corporations. This paper ascertains this relationship for the largest 100 firms listed
on the main and second board of the Bursa Malaysia. This approach allows us to
understand the differences in audit pricing strategies of companies with different
size, listing requirements and internal governance variables (i.e. individual ownership,
director’s ownership, director’s remuneration) not documented in the relevant
literature from developed markets.
This paper is organised as follows. The following section explains the
background to the auditing and audit practice in Malaysia. Section three reviews
Malaysian business environment, and relevant prior literature on the relationship
between audit fees and corporate governance is presented in section 4. Section 5
briefs on data collection and research design followed by findings and discussion
in sections 6 and 7 respectively. Section 8 concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND TO AUDITING AND AUDIT
PRACTICE IN MALAYSIA
In the early years of independence, accounting and auditing requirements and
practices in Malaysia were similar to those of the British accounting practices1. In
1958, the Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants (MACPA) was
set up by a group of British trained accountants that replicate the UK’s ICAEW in
all respects of its practices such as the professional education, standards and
discipline, except that it has no authority to regulate the profession or register
accountants. In addition, the adoption of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 marked
another similarity to the British accounting profession.
1 Malaysia gained her independence in 1957.
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The Malaysian government in 1967 has initiated to establish the Malaysian
Institute of Accountants (the MIA) under the Accountants Act 1967 with the
intention to regulate and control the practice. The MIA through the Accountants
Act 1967 has required all persons to register with the Malaysian Institute of
Accountants (MIA) before they can practice as an accountant or auditor and are
bound by a strict ethical code and professional standards.
Malaysian auditing practices adopted the International Standards on Auditing
(ISAs) as the basis for approved standards on auditing and related services that
issued by the International Auditing Practice Committee (IAPC) of the International
Federation of Accountant (IFAC). Previously, the practice adopted the International
Auditing Guidelines that had been the authoritative auditing guidelines since 19822.
Since 1 July 1998, the codified ISAs become operative for all audits and Malaysian
Standards on Auditing (MSAs) are issued to augment ISAs adopted by MIA.
MSAs were issued by the MIA as part of its efforts to define standards of auditing
and harmonize auditing practices in Malaysia. They cover topics not dealt with in
an ISA or topics where particular features of the Malaysian environment warrant a
domestic standard written specifically to address those features.
To maintain the level of professional standard of the Malaysian audit
practitioners, the MIA has recommended a guideline on audit fees calculation which
is called as a ‘Recommended Basis for Determining Audit Fees’ in its By-Laws (On
Professional Conduct). The rationale for this recommendation is to ensure a
consistent and harmonize fee levels across the board. The MIA member is expected
to counter-check their audit fees derived on time cost basis with the MIA’s
Benchmark. The audit fees is computed by multiplying the Total Assets or Gross
Turnover as shown in the financial statements with the coefficient percentage as
outlined in the MIA’s by-law.
MALAYSIAN BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
The securities industry in Malaysia effectively began in the late 19th century with
the domination of British companies in both the rubber and tin industries that had
their origins in the United Kingdom (UK), or were subsidiaries of the UK companies.
The first move towards securities trading in Malaysia was initiated with the
establishment of Singapore Stockbrokers’ Association in 1930. This was the first
formal organisation in the securities business in Malaysia (then Malaya) until the
2 The council of the MACPA has approved auditing standard for publication comprised of the
International Auditing Guideline (IAG) (approved by the MACPA) and the Malaysian Auditing
Guidelines (issued by the MACPA) to cover topics peculiar to the Malaysian environment which
warrant domestic standards written specifically to address the peculiar feature.
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formation of Malayan Stock Exchange and started their public trading on the 9th
May 1960. In 1973, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was established to
provide a central market place for buyers and sellers to transact business in shares,
bonds and various other financial securities of Malaysian listed companies3. The
KLSE is a self-regulatory organisation that governs the conducts of its member
(stock broking firms) in securities dealings. Also, it is responsible for the surveillance
of the market place and for the enforcement of its Listing Requirements, which spell
out the criteria for listing, disclosure requirements and standards to be maintained
by listed companies. During the early stage of securities industry in this region,
there was a strong link between the KLSE and Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES)
where Malaysian incorporated companies were listed and traded through the SES
and vice versa. In 1990, both stock exchanges were formally separated and all
Singaporean companies were delisted from the KLSE and vice versa.
In 1988 the second board was established on the KLSE. The second board
provides opportunity for smaller firms with great potential to grow but do not meet
the listing requirements of the main board. The listing requirements for these
companies are less stringent than those of the main board. Ow-Yong and Cheah
(2000) postulate that prior to the 1980s, the vast majority of Malaysian companies
were either family owned domestic firms or subsidiaries of foreign multinationals.
These companies were reluctant to participate in the securities industry due to
apprehension of losing control. With the introduction of the second tier market for
small and high potential firms in 1988, the participation from this group of companies
increased tremendously where 294 companies were listed on this board as at 31st
December 2002. The development of Malaysian capital market was further enhanced
by the government’s privatisation programme starting with the national electricity
company and national telephone operator. These newly listed companies are still
being controlled mainly by particular individuals or are family owned with minority
shareholding in the hands of the investing or state-controlled (Claessens et al.,
1998, 1999a, 1999b). The KLSE has been renamed as “Bursa Malaysia” since April
2004 and later listed on the Exchange.
Finally, the MESDAQ market was created on March 18, 2002 following the
merger between the Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing & Automated
3 The securities industry is governed by a number of statutes such as Securities Industry Act 1983
(SIA), Securities Industry (Central Depositories Act) 1991 (SICDA), Securities Commission Act
1993 (SCA), Futures Industry Act 1993 (FIA) and Companies Act 1965. In order to make the
regulatory structure more efficient, there are five key authorities that involved in regulating the
capital market namely the Securities Commission (SC), Central Bank (Bank Negara Malaysia/
BNM), Company Commission of Malaysia (Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia/SSM) (formerly
known as Registrar of Company), Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) and Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI).
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Quotation (MESDAQ) Berhad with the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). It
operates as a unique market with a separate identity from the KLSE’s Main and
Second Boards, catering specifically for the capital raising needs of technology-
based and high-growth potential companies. The MESDAQ Market is focused at
bringing together these companies and interested investors.
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND AUDIT FEES
Corporate Governance Dimensions
The need to establish a framework of corporate governance is derived from the
agency problem resulting from the separation of ownership and control. A governance
structure serves as a mechanism that monitors management performance and
ensures its accountability to shareholders. In addition, corporate governance can
be used as an instrument to motivate management behaviour towards achieving
corporate objectives. In this section, a number of literature based governance
dimensions expected to influence external audit price are discussed.
Individual Ownership
The agency theory postulates that the demand for timely audits is directly related
to the extent of the separation between ownership and control. In other words, the
demand for extensive audit is directly related with widespread ownership. Chan et
al. (1993) examined the relationship between the level of corporate ownership
concentration and audit fees, after controlling for other variables, in a sample of UK
quoted companies and reported negative and significant association between the
variables. They concluded that their result gives support to the agency theory in
that the more diffused the ownership from control the more extensive is the audit
and therefore price or fees charged. However, Peel and Clatworthy (2001) caution
that measuring ownership concentration by including both directors and other
outside substantial shareholders might result in an interpretation problem. They
contend that although there is support to the proposal that directors’ concentration
is an important factor affecting agency costs, the ability of substantial shareholders
to reduce agency costs and hence audit fees is questionable. In this regard, Dedman
(2000) investigated the determinants of the non-financial UK firm’s board structure
and provided no evidence to support the belief that institutional investors played
an effective role in promoting best practice in connection with the board structure
of their investee companies. Similarly, Faccio and Lasfer (2000) explored the role of
occupational funds in monitoring UK companies that hold large stakes and found
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no evidence to support that their holdings have any impact on companies’
performance, institutional investors or compliance with the Code of Best Practice.
They concluded that occupational pension funds are not effective monitors.
Consequently, combining directors’ ownership and substantial shareholders in
one variable might hide part of fact. In this study, the extent of separation between
ownership and control is measured by the percentage of shares owned by retail or
individual investors. In the Malaysian setting, businesses are generally viewed as
family businesses and a significant proportion of shares are owned by a number of
investors and government. Hence, the percentage of shares owned by individuals
form an accurate reflection of the extent of diffusion between ownership and control.
It is, therefore, hypothesized that:
H1: External audit price is positively associated with the proportion of shares owned
by individual shareholders.
Directors’ Ownership
The idea that directors’ ownership formulates the interest of shareholders and
managers is recognised by the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this
respect, Jensen and Meckling (1976) use the convergence interest hypothesis to
argue that corporate performance increases as the percentage of shares owned by
management increases since management is less willing to tempt resources away
from value maximisation. Demsetz (1983), however, challenged this argument in that
market forces would force management to observe value maximisation at any
ownership levels. Yet, Morck et al. (1988) indicated that high level of management
ownership concentration would lead to “entrenchment” and outside shareholders
will find it difficult to control management’s actions. Evidence on the relationship
between management levels of ownership and its behaviour is mixed. Studies in the
USA found that management adhere to corporate value maximisation principles at
low and high level of management ownership (Morck et al., 1988; Kole, 1995;
McConnel and Servaes, 1995). Thompson et al. (1992) reported a linear positive
relationship exists between performance and the level of management ownership in
a sample of UK companies. Short et al. (1999), however, listed a number of factors
that form dimensions of corporate governance among them were directors’
remuneration and director’s ownership. In all cases, it is fairly documented that
where management owns high proportion of shares they attempt to maximise wealth.
It is therefore hypothesized that:
H2: External audit price is negatively associated with the proportion of shares owned
by the board of directors.
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Audit Firm Status
Auditor’s report plays an important role in corporate governance mechanism as it
minimises information asymmetry between management and provides external funds.
Audit firms in Malaysia are typically classified into two main categories: national
and national affiliated to the big international audit firms. Zulkarnain et al. (2006a)
indicated that the audit firm’s reputation influences quality. They reported that the
quality of corporate reporting disclosed by companies audited by audit firms affiliated
to the big international firms is higher than that disclosed by companies audited by
local firms. It is important to mention here that large international audit firms in
Malaysia maintain the quality of their audit and usually entails additional cost. In
addition, audit firms affiliated to the big international firms incur more overhead
costs that are usually borne by the clients. In return, large companies prefer to deal
with big international audit firms to assure the public of the audit quality and
minimise agency costs. Evidence on the relationship between the status of the
audit firm and the price of external audit is not conclusive. Simunic (1980) and Firth
(1985) found no difference between fees charged by big and small audit firms and
whether the audited company is large or small. On the contrary, Palmrose (1986),
Francis and Stokes (1986) and Chan et al. (1993) provide evidence that big audit firm
price their services higher than smaller firms. It is therefore hypothesized that:
H3: Audit firms affiliated to high international audit firms are expected to charge
higher audit price than that charged by local audit firms.
Directors Remuneration
The agency theory suggests that suitable remuneration provide directors with
incentives to promote corporate objectives and ensures long-term corporate
performance (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In this respect, Main et al. (1996) reported
positive and significant association between corporate performance and directors’
remuneration. In practice, shareholders use remuneration to reduce the conflict of
interest with the management. Performance related remuneration is becoming a
common practice in both the public and private sectors. However, Short et al. (1999)
revealed that management controls the process of formulating the remuneration
package. Where remuneration is based on performance, the external auditor is
expected to undergo intensive testing of corporate accounts to verify performance
figures. Taylor and Baker (1981) suggest that a company’s ability to pay external
audit price is influenced by the level of its profitability. In other words, companies
reporting higher profits are expected to pay more in audit fees. However, Simunic
(1980) argues that companies reporting high profits decrease auditor’s risk and this
might subsequently lead to decrease in audit fees. It could further argue that increase
in reported profit could be due to efficient use of resources and reduction in overhead
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costs. This would lead to less audit work and therefore audit fees. It is therefore
hypothesized that:
H4: External audit price is negatively associated with directors’ remuneration.
Control Variables
To ascertain a clearer association between audit fees and governance, the following
variables are used as control variables in this study.
Corporate Size
Corporate size has been shown as an important factor associated with external
audit price in many previous studies (Taylor and Baker, 1981; Firth, 1985; Simon et
al., 1992; Chan et al., 1993; Anderson and Zeghal, 1994; Collier and Gregory, 1996;
Firth, 1997; Langendjik, 1997; Clatworthy and Peel, 2006). Auditing a large company
requires longer audit time and therefore leads to higher audit fees. Large companies
in Malaysia are primarily concentrated in the banking, consumer and manufacturing
sectors. Hence, the accounts of these companies are more sophisticated and require
more audit time compared to companies in the other sectors. The agency theory,
suggests that large sized companies are more likely to be scrutinised by the public
and are thus expected to incur higher agency costs. The management of a large
company would, however, try to assure the public by minimising agency cost and
appointing a prestigious and expensive audit firm. After all, large sized companies
can afford to pay higher external audit price than smaller ones and are more likely to
use external sources (stock exchange and banks) to raise funds. Using external
sources of financing entails comprehensive disclosure and hence auditing work.
Therefore large sized companies are expected to employ advanced accounting and
internal audit systems that facilitate their audit work at the expense of higher costs.
Conversely, it can be also argued that auditor concentration may result in
specialisation and economies of scale in the auditor’s costs.
Essentially, the literature documents that corporate size as the main factor that
explains the price of external audit. Though different measures of size have been
used in previous research, the total assets measure was found to be the dominant
measure. However, this research uses the market capitalization as a measure of firm
size, as asset size is based on historical information and not reflect the true size of
the firm. It is therefore hypothesized that:
H5: Large companies measured by market capitalization are expected to pay more
external audit price than smaller companies.
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Corporate Risk
Corporate risk has been used in previous studies to explain variations in external
audit price. A risky corporation is expected to run the risk of audit failure. This
would result in intensive audit testing and hence an increase in audit fees (Simunic,
1980). Due to the difficulty of identifying specific measure of risk, different proxies
have been used in the literature such as equity to total assets ratio, long-term
liabilities to equity ratio, acid test ratio, current ratio, loss sustained in the previous
year, loss sustained in the current year, working capital to total assets ratio and
corporate age. Similar to Brinn et al. (1991), this research employs the previous
year’s performance and corporate age as proxies of risk. As for previous year’s
performance, a company that sustains loss in the previous year is classified as risky
and will be subject to intensive audit testing in the year that follows and this might
add to external audit fees. The use of the age variable, however, is based on the
notion that companies run the risk of failure in the first ten years of their existence
(Hudson, 1987). Hence, young companies are expected to run a higher risk than
those associated with much older companies. However, this argument can be
challenged on the grounds that older companies are more likely to expand and thus
develop different lines of business. This would make the auditing process more
sophisticated and costly. It is therefore hypothesized that:
H6: Companies with high levels of risk measured by previous year’s loss and by age
are expected to pay higher audit price than that paid by companies reporting profits.
Non-Executive Directors to Total Directors
Shamsher and Zulkarnain (2003) and Zulkarnain et al. (2006a) have indicated that
non-executive directors as an effective monitoring agent that act in the best interest
of shareholders in particular and stakeholders at large. Borokhovich et al. (1996)
find a positive monotonic link between the proportion of outside directors and the
possibility that an outside director is employed as CEO that would benefits
shareholders. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) found a significant share price increase
following the appointment of outside directors. Conversely, Weisbach (1988)
demonstrate a strong association between managerial turnover and performance
within firms with outsider-dominated boards. These studies acknowledge the
importance and monitoring effectiveness of outside directors and are consistent
with Fama and Jensen (1983) arguments that reputation and the threat of legal
action motivate outside directors to act in the best interest of shareholders. Bhagat
and Black (1998), contend that previous studies do demonstrate how board
composition influence overall firm performance as companies with independent
boards could perform better on particular tasks, yet worse on other unstudied
tasks, leading to no net advantage in overall performance. Therefore, we hypothesized
that:
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H7: Companies with high proportion of non-executive directors are expected to
insist more audit work and therefore have a positive impact to the external audit
price.
Complexity
Complexity variable has been used extensively in many prior studies on audit pricing
model (Cameran, 2005; Chan et al., 1993; Clatworthy and Peel, 2006; Simunic, 1980;
O’Keefe et al., 1994; Joshi & Al-Bastaki, 2000). Literature documented that business
complexity of the firm being audited as a determinant of audit fees. Firm that is more
complex requires deeper and larger audit tests before an auditor could provide an
objective opinion. Indeed, auditor needs to put more effort in planning, co-ordinating
and executing the audit function, as the complexity increases. Firms with complex
business requires more time and this would result to a higher audit fee. Findings in
a recent study (Clatworthy and Peel, 2006) showed that complexity was a significant
indicator for higher audit fees and the auditor that audit complex auditee would
have more exposure to liability than non-complex auditee. Consistent with prior
findings in the literature, this paper uses the number of subsidiaries in the auditee’s
group as the indicator for complexity.
H8: Companies with high number of subsidiaries (as a proxy measure of level of
complexity ) are expected to require more audit effort and therefore have an impact
to the external audit price.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Testable Model
Based on documented literature, an ordinary least square regression (OLS) is used
to test the relationship between the dependant variable (external audit price) and
the explanatory variables (percentage of shares owned by individual shareholders,
percentage of shares owned by the board of directors, corporate size, status of the
audit firm, corporate level of risk measured previous year’s losses and corporate
age, directors remunerations and dividend payout). The relationship between the
dependent and independent variables is expressed in the following regression
model.
EXAP = α0 + α1IOWN + α2BOWN + α3SAUD + α4BREM + α5ASSET + α6PRLO +
α7CAGE + α8NETD + α9CPLX + ε
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Where:
EXAP = External Audit price
(+) INDV = Percentage of shares owned by individual investors
(-) BOWN = Percentage of shares owned by individual directors
(+) SAUD = Status of Audit Firm
(±) BREM = Boards remuneration
(+) ASSET = Total Assets
(-) PRLO = Previous year’s Loss (1), (0) otherwise
(±) CAGE = Corporate Age
(+) NETD = Ratio of Non-executive Directors to Total Directors
(+) CPLX = Complexity
Data Collection
Profiles of all companies listed on the Main Board and the Second Board of Bursa
Malaysia were gathered from the stock market’s directory and a list of largest 100
firms (based on market capitalization) were sampled from Datastream database.
Financial statements of all sampled firms were sourced from the annual reports
posted on the Bursa Malaysia web page.
FINDINGS
Descriptive Statistics
Analysis of the variables showed small positive and negative skewness and kurtosis
satisfying the distribution properties of financial figures referred to by Ezzamel and
Mar-Molinero (1990) and Zulkarnain et al (2006b) 4.
The normality assumption, which was based on the normal distribution, is
important for the interpretation of the tests of significance, and if the data does not
satisfy this assumption, the results might be biased. To satisfy the normality
assumption, most of the variables have been transformed either into logarithm or
square root form (Afifi and Clark, 1990; Zulkarnain et al., 2006b).
Finally, outliers were detected using a threshold at three-standard deviation
(Hair et al, 1998).
4 Before deriving the final variables for analysis, it is found that most of the variables violated
the normality assumption with high value of skewness and kurtosis. The appropriate remedial
action has been taken where most of the variables were transformed either to logarithm or
square root.
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Correlations
Pearson correlation coefficients of variables used are summarised in Table 1. The
findings in the table show that those explanatory variables such as SUBS, BREM
and ASSET are positively related, and IOWN is negatively associated with external
audit price. It is also evident that a number of significant correlations exist between
the explanatory variables which imply multicollinearity. Hence different tests have
been performed to assess the severity of the multicollinearity problem. However,
the variance inflation factor (VIF) procedure was applied to address this problem.
The VIFs for all variables reported in Table 2 show a value of less than 2, which is far
below 10 when multicollinearity is viewed as a serious problem (Neter et al., 1989).
Hence, the explanatory variables used in this study do not pose a serious
multicollinearity problem and allows the standard interpretation of the regression
coefficients.
Multivariate Analysis
This paper employed nine independent variables to explain the external audit price
of Malaysian listed firms. The result of the regression analysis is reported in Table
2 reveals that all explanatory variables are responsible for almost 70% of variations
in the price of external audit (p<0.001). For main board companies, size (p<0.001),
complexity measured by number of subsidiaries (p<0.001), directors’ remuneration
(p<0.001), individual ownership (pd<0.001) and companies’ age (p<0.1) significantly
explain the audit price. For second board companies, variables that reflects complexity
measured by number of subsidiaries (p<0.001), corporate size (p<0.001), individual
ownership (p<0.1), proportion of non-executive directors to total directors (p<0.1)
and companies’ age (p<0.1) are significant determinants of audit fees pricing.
This finding is consistent with that documented on similar studies in developed
markets (Taylor and Baker, 1981; Firth, 1985; Simon, et al., 1988; Simon et al., 1992;
Chan et al., 1993; Anderson and Zeghal, 1994; Collier and Gregory, 1996; Firth,
1997; Langendjik, 1997; Clatworthy and Peel, 2006). For second board companies,
complexity measured by number of subsidiaries was the strongest determinant of
audit price. This result is consistent with the literature (Taylor and Baker (1981),
Francis (1984), Firth (1985), Low et al. (1990), Simon et al. (1992), Iyer and Iyer (1993),
Anderson and Zeghal (1994), Pong and Wittington (1994), Johnson et al. (1995),
Collier and Gregory (1996), Sandra and Patrick (1996), Firth (1997), Mike (1997),
Langendijk (1997) and Joshi and Al-Bastaki (2000)).
Contrary to expectation of the agency theory, individual ownership had a
significant and negative association to external audit price for companies listed on
the main and second board. The agency theory postulates that as the separation
between ownership and management intensifies, audit testing also intensifies
resulting in high audit fees. This finding are inconsistent with the notion that
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Table 2: Results of the multivariate regression (audit fees is the dependent
variable
Panel A: Main Board Companies n = 69
Coefficient t-Ratio Standardized Rank Significant
Coefficient Level VIF
(Constant) 4.170 3.299 0.002
BREM 0.000 2.230 0.229 3 0.030 2.127
BOWN 0.051 1.482 0.113 NS 0.144 1.171
CAGE -0.097 -0.824 -0.063 NS 0.413 1.173
SUBS 0.332 2.840 0.281 2 0.006 1.979
ASST 0.330 6.218 0.509 1 0.000 1.354
IOWN -1.024 -2.455 -0.194 4 0.017 1.267
SAUD 0.305 1.379 0.103 NS 0.173 1.140
PRLO 0.526 1.112 0.100 NS 0.271 1.630
NETD -0.433 -0.840 -0.070 NS 0.404 1.410
R 0.842
R Square 0.708
Adjusted R Square 0.664
F 15.921
Significant F 0.000
Panel B: Second Board Companies n = 79
Coefficient t-Ratio Standardized Rank Significant
Coefficient Level VIF
(Constant) 2.858 1.715 0.091
BREM 0.000 1.107 0.092 NS 0.272 1.387
BOWN 0.053 1.433 0.119 NS 0.156 1.371
CAGE -0.100 -1.811 -0.139 5 0.074 1.173
SUBS 0.505 7.761 0.587 1 0.000 1.144
ASST 0.393 4.428 0.347 2 0.000 1.226
IOWN -0.500 -1.858 -0.151 3 0.067 1.327
SAUD 0.090 0.796 0.059 NS 0.429 1.094
PRLO -0.011 -0.084 -0.006 NS 0.934 1.179
NETD 0.594 1.823 0.140 4 0.073 1.179
R 0.809
R Square 0.655
Adjusted R Square 0.610
F 14.535
Significant F 0.000
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external audit price is positively associated with the number of individual
shareholders. Similarly, corporate age was found to be a significant and negatively
associated with external audit price for companies listed on the second board. This
might indicate the auditor’s concern of the potential audit risk of new corporate
firms that are listed on the second board.
A summary of the direction of the relationship between external audit price and
the variables used are reported in Table 3.
Table 3 Summary of the result of the hypotheses testing
Panel A: Main Board Companies
Hypothesis Hypothesis Resulted Hypothesis
Direction Direction Accepted (√)
Rejected (X)
H1: Individual Ownership (+) - X
H2: Board Ownership (-) +
H3: Audit Firm’s Status (+) +
H4: Directors Remuneration (+) - √
H5: Assets (-) + √
H6: Previous Year’s Loss () -
H7: Corporate Age (±) +
H8: Subsidiaries (+) + √
H9: Non-Executive to Total (+) +
Directors
Panel B: Second Board Companies
Hypothesis Hypothesis Resulted Hypothesis
Direction Direction Accepted (√)
Rejected (X)
H1: Individual Ownership (+) - X
H2: Board Ownership (-) +
H3: Audit Firm’s Status (+) +
H4: Directors Remuneration (+) +
H5: Assets (-) + √
H6: Previous Year’s Loss (±) -
H7: Corporate Age (±) - √
H8: Subsidiaries (+) + √
H9: Non-Executive to Total (+) + √
Directors
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DISCUSSION
This paper provides some preliminary evidence that corporate size explains audit
pricing. This is consistent with the notion that auditors for large size companies
require more time and effort to examine the client operations, and analyse the data
and information (Simunic, 1980; Firth, 1985; Chan et al., 1993; Pong and Whittington,
1994). The auditor needs to perform detail audit procedures to avoid risk of material
misstatement (Joshi and Al-Bastaki, 2001).
Another important determinant of audit pricing is the complexity measured by
number of subsidiaries. Perhaps, a more complex audit client i.e. client with large
number of subsidiaries that have diverse business operations require more complex
audit work, requiring higher audit fess. Indeed, auditor needs to apply more audit
procedures to examine individual company financial statements and consolidated
financial statement. Auditor work would be more complicated when involve foreign
subsidiaries that are required to comply with various rules and regulations imposed
by home country, therefore, requires more audit procedures and higher audit fees.
It was found that a governance variable namely individual ownership is
significantly and negatively associated with the level of audit pricing, contrary to
the expectation of the agency theory that explain the demand for extensive audit
increases with widespread ownership. The association explains that the more
disperse share ownership, the less audit fee would be. Perhaps, the concentration
of share ownership to individual, family and state explain the negative association.
Indeed, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/1998 was partly contributed by
concentration of share ownership of the majority of public listed companies in the
hands of few families/individuals and the state. This phenomenon is quite different
from that documented in most industrialised nations (i.e. the UK and US), where
share ownership is concentrated in the hand of relatively few powerful institutional
investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds. Ownership
concentration of Malaysian listed firms before and during the crisis period are
documented as follows: (i) single shareholder controls more than two-thirds of
firms, (ii) the separation of management from ownership control is rare, (iii) about
sixty percent of top management of the firms that are not widely held are associated
with the family of the controlling shareholders, (iv) family control is extensive in
more than half of East Asian corporations, (v) in some countries, a significant share
of corporate assets are controlled by a small number of families; for example, the
largest ten families in Malaysia control a quarter of the corporate sector, and Malaysia
was also ranked as the second highest concentration of control (after Hong Kong),
at 76.2 per cent of GDP (Claessens et al., 2000). Consequently, the corporate policies
and practices, reporting practices, level of disclosure and corporate culture may not
be compliant with best governance practices as observed in developed markets.
Directors’ remuneration variable was found to have a significant and positive
relationship with audit pricing for main board companies. The association might
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explain the director’s incentive to promote corporate objectives consistent with the
shareholders interest. Thus, directors would try to show their performance and
have an interest to be audited to indicate their activities throughout the year to the
shareholders. On the other hand, shareholders would use remuneration to reduce
the conflict of interest. Thus, a more audit work is needed when more remuneration
is paid to the directors.
The proportion of non-executive directors to total directors and corporate age
were significantly associated with audit pricing of second board companies. As
indicated in prior studies that non-executive directors have incentive to conduct
effective monitoring on business operations. The existence of higher proportion of
non-executive directors on the board would increase audit work as these directors
would raise their concern and perform their monitoring role, which would increase
more audit work. Thus, auditor would charge more audit fees to their clients. However,
a negative relationship was also evidenced between corporate age and audit pricing
model. In this context, young corporations will have higher risk of failure or incur
losses in their early years of operation. Thus, they are subjected to more audit work
and as a result auditor would charge more fees to young companies. Therefore,
there would be an inverse relationship between corporate age and audit fees.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the association between corporate governance and
variations in the external audit price. The evidence of this association from the
listed firms in Bursa Malaysia provides a unique contribution to the literature on
this issue. The association of corporate governance proxies such as percentage of
shares owned by individual shareholders, director’s remuneration, percentage of
shares owned by directors, with audit price was examined. The findings showed
that external audit price is positively and significantly associated with corporate
size, complexity and internal governance variable (i.e. directors remuneration) for
main board companies. The business complexity, corporate size and internal
governance variables (i.e. proportion of non-executive directors to total directors)
were important determinants of audit pricing for the second board firms. External
audit price, however, is negatively and significantly related with the individual
ownership of shareholders for companies listed on the main and second board, and
companies’ age for companies listed on the second board.
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